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TOO ATTENTIVE TO OUR DUTY: THE FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT 
UNDERLYING HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE UK 
  
Introduction 
 
The position of human rights in the UK since the creation of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA) has been characterised by a lack of popular acceptance, and calls from both sides of 
the political spectrum for either its repeal, or the amendment of it to give a greater place to 
duties and responsibilities within it.1 Its place within the UK’s slowly and incrementally 
evolving constitution2 is uncertain and precarious. I will suggest that underlying this is a 
fundamental conflict between the conception of the individual which the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated as the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), and the idea of the individual which has historically formed the basis of the UK 
Constitution. Whereas the Strasbourg court has recognised the Convention as ultimately 
protecting the capacity to freely choose how to live, the core principles of the UK 
Constitution have long been grounded in the idea of the individual as a subject defined by the 
duties they owe. Using the case law of the ECtHR and the UK courts, I will show how 
recognising this underlying tension between these two conceptions of the individual gives a 
greater understanding of the position and judicial interpretation of the Convention rights in 
the UK.  
                                                 
1 Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (London: Ministry of Justice, 
2012) paras 88(v) & (vii); Ministry of Justice, Rights and Responsibilities: Developing our Constitutional 
Framework (Cm 7577) paras 2.15, 2.17 & 2.20; and The Conservative Party ‘Protecting Human Rights in the 
UK’ (The Conservative Party 2014) pp 4 & 5; available at 
https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf (accessed 30 August 
2015). 
2 J Laws The Common Law Constitution (Cambridge: CUP 2014) pp 6-9 & 90. 
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According to the ECtHR, the foundation from which the authority of the ECHR 
derives and which its substantive requirements protect, is the capacity of individual human 
beings to choose how to live and through their choices define their own identity. Following a 
series of cases this was recognised directly by the ECtHR in Pretty v UK.3 I will begin by 
showing that the place of this conception of the individual as underlying the Convention is 
supported by the rights theories of Kai Möller,4 James Griffin5 and Ronald Dworkin.6  
The UK Constitution is not founded upon this conception of the individual. I will 
show how the core constitutional tenets, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, 
historically derive from a fundamental conception of the individual as one defined by the 
duties they owe, not their capacity for freedom of choice. In contrast to America and France, 
which rejected duty-based constitutions in the 18th Century Enlightenment, the foundation of 
the UK Constitution has only slowly and incompletely evolved to recognise individuals as 
primarily and inherently possessing the freedom to choose how to live. Through legislation 
including the Representation of the People Acts and the devolution Acts, and the judicial 
development of constitutional principles, such as civil liberties, the principle of legality and 
the tentative statements in R (Jackson) v Attorney General,7 increased constitutional 
recognition and protection has been given to a different conception of the individual. Using 
the cases of R (Purdy) v DPP8 and R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice9 I will argue that this 
slow evolution was artificially and controversially accelerated by the creation of the HRA 
and the effect domestic courts have given to Strasbourg jurisprudence under it. I will show 
that acceptance of this distinct basis for Convention rights has not been universal amongst the 
UK judiciary, and differences between the foundational conception of the individual assumed 
                                                 
3 (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
4 K Möller The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
5 J Griffin On Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2008).  
6 R Dworkin ‘Is there a right to pornography?’ (1981) 1(2) OJLS 177. 
7 [2005] UKHL 56. 
8 [2009] UKHL 45. 
9 [2014] UKSC 38. 
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and applied by different judges substantively influence their interpretations of the Convention 
rights. 
The HRA has precipitated a direct conflict between the choice foundation for the 
Convention rights the ECtHR had recognised, and the conception of the individual as defined 
by the duties they owe which remains the foundation of the central principles of the UK 
Constitution. Recognising this collision of the underlying tectonic plates of the Convention 
and Constitution beneath the place of the HRA within the UK legal order and in judgments 
under it, explains at the most fundamental level the criticism of the HRA, and the calls for a 
replacement bill of rights which gives a more prominent place to ideas of individual duty and 
responsibility. Acknowledging this leads to the conclusion that, for the Convention’s 
requirements and its application to be fully embraced in the UK, it must be understood and 
accepted as introducing to the UK not only new laws, but with them a different foundation 
for law, a different conception of the individual. 
 
The Foundation of the Convention Rights 
 
In stating that it gives effect to the non-legally binding Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948 in its preamble, the ECHR claims to have legitimacy and authority not deriving 
solely from substantive law. Consequentially, the nature of the Convention’s theoretical 
foundation is of fundamental importance to the justification and interpretation of the 
substantive rights it contains. In line with other national and international rights documents, 
the Convention’s fundamental foundation has been argued by theorists and recognised by the 
ECtHR to be the human capacity to choose what purposes to pursue in life, through which an 
individual defines their identity. 
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Working back from the shared characteristics10 of the predominant model of national 
and international human rights protection,11 Möller identifies the ‘protected interests 
conception of autonomy’ as the underlying central principle which fits their features.12 He 
argues that the Convention and other rights documents practically protect a person’s control 
over their body and their choices as to how to live their life.13 As a part of this global model 
of rights protection, Möller argues that the ECtHR has interpreted the Convention as 
grounded in protecting an individual’s capacity for ‘existential self-understanding’:14  their 
view of who they are and their choices through which they shape and manifest this.15 
Similarly, Griffin argues that what ultimately underlies the modern ‘Western-inspired 
discourse of human rights’, of which the Convention is a part, is the unique capacity of 
human beings to create their own identities through autonomous choices.16 Thus he claims 
the content of the idea of human dignity – which the UN rights documents use as a ‘place 
holder’ term, which is not stated to have specific content, encompassing any basis claimed for 
human rights in the characteristics of the human person17 – ‘what we attach value to, . . . is 
our capacity to choose and to pursue our conception of a worthwhile life’.18 
Although there is no statement of such a basis in the Convention’s preamble and, as I 
will show, it is at odds with the conception of the nature and purpose of the Convention 
which influenced the UK government’s significant contribution to its drafting,19 it is the basis 
that the ECtHR has recognised as fundamentally underlying and justifying the Convention 
                                                 
10 Möller, above n 4, pp 3, 5, 10 & 13. The core features he identifies are: rights inflation, the protection of 
positive and socio-economic rights not just negative rights, the horizontal and vertical effect of rights, and the 
subjection of the vast majority of rights to a balancing and proportionality test. 
11 Ibid, pp 15-16, 20, 30-33, 35 & 37-39. 
12 Ibid, pp 63-71. 
13 Ibid, p 58. 
14 Ibid, p 59. 
15 Ibid, pp 60-61. 
16 Griffin, above n 5, pp 26, 31-33. 
17 Ibid, p 45, C McCrudden ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) EJIL 
655 at 677, 680 & 697. cf B Douglas ‘Undignified Rights: The Importance of a Basis in Dignity for the 
Possession of Rights in the United Kingdom’ [2015] PL 241; and T Hannant ‘Still undignified rights: a 
disagreement with Benedict Douglas’ [2016] PL 555. 
18 Griffin, above n 5, p 44. 
19 Below text to n 108. 
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rights. In the case of Pretty v UK court stated that ‘[t]he very essence of the Convention is 
respect for human dignity and human freedom.’20 In recognising that ‘the notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of’ Article 8,21 the court 
accepted the applicant’s submission that the protection of ‘self-determination runs like a 
thread through the Convention as a whole’.22 In relying upon this as a foundation to support 
its interpretation of the scope of Article 8, the court held that the right and by implication the 
whole Convention protected ‘individual autonomy’;23 the capacity ‘to conduct one's life in a 
manner of one's own choosing’.24   
The ultimate recognition of this basis in Pretty was the fruition of the invocation of a 
deeper basis for the Convention in the universal defining characteristic of the individual, to 
justify interpretations of the rights, begun in Tyrer v UK and developed in SW & CR v UK.25 
In Tyrer the ECtHR held that it was contrary to ‘human dignity and physical integrity’ to 
subject an individual to corporal punishment. The court reached this conclusion on the basis 
that such treatment, for the duration of its application, degrades an individual into ‘an object 
in the power of the authorities’,26 removing any capacity as a being capable of choice.27 This 
justification was further developed as a broader basis for the Convention in SW. Here the 
Grand Chamber held that the ‘very essence’ of the ‘fundamental objectives’ of the 
Convention was the respect for ‘human dignity and human freedom.’28 Using this as a basis 
to interpret whether Article 7’s ban on retrospective criminal offences was violated by the 
recognition of a new Common Law offence, the ECtHR held that the law’s development by 
                                                 
20 Pretty, above n 3, at [65]. 
21 Ibid, at [61]. 
22 Ibid, at [58]. 
23 Ibid, at [61]. 
24 Ibid, at [62]. 
25 Tyrer v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1; SW & CR v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 363; and J Christoffersen Fair Balance 
Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) pp 142-145. 
26 Tyrer, above n 25, at [33]. 
27 Ibid; and Griffin, above n 5, p 33. 
28 SW, above n 25, at [44]. 
Benedict Douglas 
6 
 
the courts to recognise rape within marriage as unlawful did not violate the Convention.29 
Both cases recognised and protected the capacity of individuals as beings with the capacity 
for choice. The subsequent recognition that the Convention was ultimately grounded in this 
capacity for choice in Pretty, was confirmed by the Court in Goodwin v UK.30 Here again the 
court elided ‘human dignity and human freedom’ in holding that the Convention protects ‘the 
personal sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as 
individual human beings.’31 
Thus the ECtHR has affirmed that the capacity to choose how to live described by 
Möller and Griffin is the basis of the Convention as a whole. All the Convention rights can be 
interpreted as protecting the manifestation of this capacity in various forms. Rights such as 
Freedom of Expression in Article 10, directly protect the pursuit of particular substantive 
purposes an individual has chosen.32 Whilst others protect characteristics and conditions 
which are implicitly necessary for the exercise of the capacity to choose how to live. Thus 
life, protected by Article 2, is the most basic characteristic which must be respected and 
protected for individuals to be able to choose how to act.33 More procedural rights, such as 
the Article 6 right to a fair trial, are essential to ensuring that a person is not unjustly 
restricted in their ability to pursue their life choices.  
Article 8 is the right which has been used most directly and openly by the ECtHR to 
give protection to the capacity for self-defining choice. This Article states a right to respect 
for a list of protected interests: a person’s private and family life, their home and 
correspondence.34 In spite of the Convention’s attempt to specify the interests Article 8 
protects, the overlap it has been held to have with the protection given by many of the other 
                                                 
29 Ibid, at [44]-[45]. 
30 Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 
31 Ibid, at [90]. 
32 D Beyleveld ‘The Principle of Generic Consistency as the Supreme Principle of Human Rights’ (2012) 13 
HRR 1 at 7. 
33 Möller, above n 4, p 88. 
34 Article 8 ECHR. 
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Convention rights shows it to be the most interpretively open right.35 The reason for this 
overlap is that, whilst other Convention rights can be seen to protect individual’s choices by 
prohibiting certain types of compulsion or coercion, and facilitating the exercise of particular 
choices,36 Article 8 has been uniquely interpreted by the ECtHR as ‘most explicitly’ giving 
protection to the substantive and open manifestation of the capacity for identity defining 
choice.37 Thus in Von Hannover v Germany (No.2) Article 8 was described as protecting ‘the 
development . . . of the personality of each individual’ through their free choices as to how to 
live, encompassing their ‘personal identity,’38 going beyond just protecting their personality 
in a narrow sense.39  This has enabled it to be used by the court to fill in the gaps where other 
more specific Convention rights do not clearly protect an individual’s particular expression of 
their identity.40 Thus in Goodwin the ECtHR applied it to interpret Article 8 as protecting a 
right to have one’s choice of gender recognised.41 
30 years prior to Pretty, Ronald Dworkin argued that the protection of individual 
capacity to choose how to live must underlie the substantive human rights protected by any 
legal system committed to the equality of individuals.42 In the context of trying to 
conceptualise the limits of freedom of expression, he contended that detailed substantive 
statements of rights protect an individual’s more abstract ‘right to moral independence.’43 If a 
society sees all individuals as of equal value it must recognise that their life choices are 
equally valid, though they must be weighed and balanced against each other where they 
                                                 
35 Al Nashiri v Poland (2015) 60 EHRR 16 (Articles 3, 5 & 8); Mizzi v Malta (2008) 46 EHRR 27 (Articles 6 & 
8); Sanchez Cardenas v Norway (2009) 49 EHRR 6 (Articles 6 & 8); Hoffmann v Austria (1994) EHRR 293 
(Articles 8 & 9); Pay v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR SE2 (Articles 8 & 10); Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden 
(2007) 44 EHRR 2 (Articles 8, 10 & 11); Dickson v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 21 (Articles 8 & 12); and   
Merger v France (2006) 43 EHRR 51 (Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1). 
36 Möller, above n 4, p 88 reaches the same conclusion with his conception of autonomy reductively derived 
from the Global Modal of Constitutional Rights.  
37 Pretty, above n 3, [58]; and ibid, pp 63 & 88.  
38 Von Hanover v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 15 at [95]. 
39 Möller, above n 4, pp 59-60. 
40 Ibid, pp 62, 79 & 88. 
41 Goodwin, above n 30, at [90]-[91]. 
42 Dworkin, above n 6, at 205. 
43 Ibid, at 194 & 199. 
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conflict to determine the extent to which their pursuit should be respected.44 Thus Dworkin 
recognised, as Möller, Griffin and the ECtHR have subsequently, that human rights protect an 
individual’s freedom of choice as to how to live their lives.45  
Dworkin and Neil McCormick respectively labelled this theoretical foundation in the 
capacity to choose how to live as the ‘rights basis’ and ‘will theory’ understanding of human 
rights.46  They distinguished it from ‘duties based’ and ‘interest’ theories, neither of which 
have the protection of the capacity for freedom of choice as their fundamentally basis; rather 
the former views individuals as beings fundamentally bound to comply with a code of 
behaviour, and the latter defines them as bound to act in a way which respects the favoured 
interests of others.47  It will be my central argument in the middle section of this article that 
the basis of the UK Constitution is not a conception of the individual fundamentally defined 
by their capacity to freely choose how to live; instead it has long defined people in terms of 
the duties they owe. I will argue that this is why the HRA, in incorporating Convention rights 
interpreted by the ECtHR as protecting a conception of the individual fundamentally defined 
by the capacity for choice, has faced hostility. For the sake of clarity and consistency with the 
language of the ECtHR, and the commonality of the capacity for choice to both Dworkin and 
McCormack’s descriptions, I will continue to use the term choice-basis for what they label 
the ‘rights’ and ‘will’ foundation for rights. 
 
The Convention’s Basis as the Source of the HRA’s Controversy  
 
Understanding the Convention as grounded in protecting the individual’s capacity for choice 
is vital to understanding why it has attracted such controversy in the UK, and most 
                                                 
44 Ibid, at 205-206 & 211-212. 
45 Ibid, at 194. 
46 R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1997) p 172; and N MacCormick ‘Rights in 
Legislation’ in P Hacker and J Raz (eds) Law, Morality and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) p 192.  
47 Ibid.  
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vehemently in England.48 It explains at a fundamental level the precarious position of the 
HRA. This is not merely a product of the politically sensitive circumstances in which 
Convention rights have been invoked by unpopular minorities.49 Rather, it reveals a deeper 
conflict between the basis of the Convention recognised by the ECtHR, and the different 
basis which has long underpinned the UK Constitution. The UK’s history has resulted in a 
Constitution grounded upon a conception of the individual as ultimately defined by the duties 
they owe, rather than their capacity for choice and the substantive choices they make. 
Although this basis of the UK Constitution has been partially eroded over the centuries by 
claims for individual freedom, the incorporation of a rights regime interpreted by the ECtHR 
as rooted in the capacity to freely choose how to live, is a direct challenge to the duty 
foundation. 
 
The Foundation of the UK Constitution 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of a constitution or moral theory underpinned by a duty 
conception of the individual is that its basis is not the capacity of the individual to choose 
how to live their life.50 Duty-based theories state a different conception of the individual.51 
They view the individual not as inherently possessing the freedom to choose, but as defined 
by the capacity to owe duties which circumscribe their permissible actions, their identity thus 
deriving from their obligations not their choices. 
 That the UK Constitution has not developed a basis for law or conception of human 
rights founded in the individual capacity for freedom of choice, and instead conceptualises 
                                                 
48 Commission on a Bill of Rights, above n 1; and below text to n 104. 
49 eg A Wagner and H Chapman ‘The 14 Worst Human Rights Myths’ (Rights Info); available at 
http://rightsinfo.org/infographics/the-14-worst-human-rights-myths (accessed 19 October 2016); and S. 
Chakrabarti On Liberty (London: Penguin 2015) pp 92-93 & 132-133. 
50 M Kramer ‘Rights Without Trimmings’ in M Kramer and others (eds) A Debate Over Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998) pp 61-62. 
51 Dworkin, above n 46, p 172; and MacCormick, above n 46, p 192. 
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people fundamentally as duty holders, is a product of its history. Walter Bagehot in his 
Victorian analysis of the English Constitution recognised this.52 Arguing that the influence of 
the history of England upon the ‘common idea [of the nature of our national] character cannot 
be exaggerated’,53 he described the people of 19th Century England as ‘a deferential nation’ 
who fundamentally see their relationship with the power of the state as defined by the duty 
they owe to the queen.54 He stated ‘our constitution is not based on equality . . . but upon 
certain ancient feelings of deference’55 of individuals to state power, rooted in the easily 
grasped notion of a duty owed to the monarch who was divinely anointed by God to rule56 
whom Christian subjects had a duty to obey.57  Thus for Bagehot the defining characteristic 
of the individual under the Constitution, whose principles govern the whole UK, not just 
England, was to be capable of bearing duties. 
 The UK Constitution’s core principles are unchanged from Bagehot’s time and 
continue their adherence to a duty foundation. Parliamentary Sovereignty, the sovereignty of 
the Queen in Parliament, ‘the most fundamental rule’ of UK constitutional law,58 places a 
duty on all to obey the will of Parliament.59 There are ultimately no constitutional grounds on 
which citizen or court can hold themselves not to be bound to conform to Parliament’s laws.60  
The other central tenant of the UK Constitution is the Rule of Law.61 But at its core this too 
                                                 
52 W Bagehot The English Constitution (first published 1867, Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
53 Ibid, p 190. 
54 Ibid, p 192. 
55 Ibid, p 199. cf  above text to n 42. 
56 Ibid, pp 28 & 41-42. 
57 A Pagden The Enlightenment (Oxford: OUP, 2013) pp 250-254; and D Orton ‘Royal Piety and Davidic 
Imitation: Cultivating Political Capital in the Alfredian Psalms’ (2015) 99 Neophiologus 477 at 478, 480-481, 
485 & 489-490. 
58 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) at [20], cf R 
(Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 at [43] ‘Parliamentary sovereignty 
is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution…’ (my emphasis). 
59 Miller EWHC, above n 58, at [20] & [22]. 
60 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No2) [1991] 1 AC 603 at 658-659; Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) at [62]-[64]; R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General 
[2007] UKHL 52 at [112]; Miller EWHC, above n 58, at [20] & [22]; and J Laws ‘Constitutional Guarantees’ 
(2008) 29(1) Stat L R 1, at 3, 6-7 & 10. 
61 T Bingham The Rule of Law (London: Penguin, 2011) p 160. 
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states only that all are ‘bound by and entitled to the benefits of [the] laws’;62 all have a duty 
to obey the laws. These constitutional features embody a fundamental foundation in a 
conception of the individual, who until 1949 was referred to as a subject not a citizen,63 
defined by the duties they owe, not one whose fundamental value is their capacity to choose 
how to live and through their choices define their own identity. 
 The influence of this underlying conception of the individual, as part of a constitution 
centred on deference to power, was recognised by JAG Griffith in his analysis of the interests 
protected by the judiciary. He characterised judges as most fundamentally perceiving 
themselves to be under a duty to obey the law, regardless of the content of the law.64 This he 
argued, led them to routinely prioritise obedience to the law over the ‘liberty’, the freedom of 
choice, of the individual.65 The concept of civil liberties, which prior to the HRA gave 
protection against the state to some of the interests now safeguarded by the Convention 
rights, is consistent with this. It embodies the protection of a conception of an individual 
defined by duties, not their capacity to freely choose how to live. The kernel of the UK civil 
liberties idea is that the individual is free to do anything the law does not prohibit.66 But this 
is premised on the idea that an individual first and foremost has a duty to obey the state’s 
laws, only outside of what these prohibit are they free to act as they wish.67 An individual’s 
freedom is only what remains after their legal duties and the duties of the courts to enforce 
the law are satisfied.  
Outside the UK, a sharp departure from this duty-based foundation towards the choice-
based foundation of rights and constitutions, and ultimately the ECtHR’s interpretation of the 
                                                 
62 Ibid, p 8. 
63 British Nationality Act 1948. 
64 JAG Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Harper Collins, 5th edn, 1997) pp 296-297 & 338-339. 
65 Ibid, pp 297 & 339. 
66 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch. 344 at 357; and Countryside Alliance, above n 60, at 
[112]. 
67 T Hobbes Leviathan (first published 1651, Cambridge: CUP, 1996) pp 147-14 & 152. 
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Convention rights, can be traced to the Enlightenment.68 This 18th Century intellectual 
movement was characterised by a critique of the feudal and religious duties which dictated 
the course of people’s lives.69 As part of this, some societies moved towards increased 
individual freedom of thought and reason,70 and recognised claims of rights to these things, 
free from the previous proscriptive duties.71 These ideas were given effect to in the 
revolutions of America and France.72 The statements of individual freedom and liberté 
prominent in their revolutionary statements of rights are not mere rhetorical devices. They are 
the expression of a desire to establish a different relationship between the individual and the 
state, one where individual freedom of choice as to how to live is the foundation of the law, 
not duty to state or sovereign.73 Thus the American Declaration of Independence proclaims 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes 
destructive of  these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and 
to institute a new government. (my emphasis) 
Their starting point for the authority of the state and its laws was individual freedom of 
choice as to how to live, not an unbreakable duty to the sovereign.74 With this, in these legal 
systems, came the idea that rights protecting this freedom were inalienable to the individual.75  
                                                 
68 M Ishay The History of Human Rights (London: University of California Press 2008) p 64. 
69 Ibid, pp 71-72. 
70 Pagden, above n 68, pp 2, 4 & 15-16. 
71 N Hampson The Enlightenment (London: Penguin, 1990) p 252; Ishay, above n 68, p 69; and ibid, p 15. 
72 Ishay, above n 68, pp 65 & 75; and Hampson, above n 71, pp 256. 
73 Ishay, above n 68, pp 75 & 94. 
74 Pagden, above n 57, pp 254-255. 
75 Douglas, above n 17, at 245. 
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Conversely, in the UK, the duty conception of the individual influenced the 
contemporaneous rejection by Jeremy Bentham and Edmund Burke of the idea that 
individuals could or should have rights which overrode their duty to obey the sovereign.76 
Bentham famously stated the idea of such rights were ‘nonsense on stilts’, because rights are 
‘the children of the law’ and had no deeper basis beyond their grant by the state to the 
individual.77 Instead he perceived the ‘habit of obedience’ of individuals as the foundation for 
government, law, rights and liberties.78 Similarly, Burke argued that such rights would be a 
disruptive departure from the UK’s prevailing constitutional order.79 He rejected the French 
revolutionary idea that individuals have inalienable ‘rights of man’, including the right to 
choose their governors,80 as incompatible with the Constitution ‘inherit[ed] from our 
forefathers’, which he maintained gave sufficient protection to the liberties and rights of the 
individual.81 
As there was no sudden revolution and shift to a choice-based conception of the 
individual as a foundation for the law, the Enlightenment conception of the individual was 
not openly adopted in the UK with a clear rejection of the duty understanding of the 
individual. Rather the Enlightenment ideal of the individual as defined by choice has only 
slowly and incompletely permeated the UK Constitution.  
 
Unsuccessful Challenges to the Duty Basis 
 
Alan Macfarlane claims that protection of English individual liberty can be traced to 
the 13th Century; with increasing protections for land ownership from that time bringing with 
                                                 
76 Ibid, at 246. 
77 J Boweing (ed.) The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843) Vol.II, p 51 &  
Vol.III, pp.160 and 185.  
78 Ibid, p 50. 
79 E Burke Reflection on the Revolution in France (first published 1867, London: Penguin, 2004) p 148 & 152. 
80 Ibid, pp 97-100 & 104. 
81 Ibid, pp 117-119 & 151. 
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it greater protection for the freedom of the individual to choose how to live compared to 
continental Europe.82 Indeed, he argues that the US Declaration of Independence is a 
manifestation of exported English individualism.83 In a sense he is correct, claims and laws 
for the protection of the freedom of the individual have been made throughout the UK’s 
history; Burke gives the Magna Carta 1215 and the Declaration of Right 1689 as examples.84 
However, these have never amounted to the clear recognition of the capacity of the individual 
to choose how to live as the basis of the UK Constitution. The protection of individual 
freedom of choice Macfarlane describes came with property ownership, and was therefore 
not inalienable to the individual, and could not override the ultimate duty to obey the 
sovereign. This is illustrated by the necessity of landownership in order to vote until 1918 for 
men, and 1928 for some women, and echoes still in the UK political trope of a property 
owning democracy.85  
There have been calls and movements for the recognition of a different basis for the 
Constitution over the centuries, but these are notable because they are exceptions and direct 
challenges to the duty basis. John Wilkes writing in the 18th Century argued for the 
disentanglement of liberty from property, and a system of government grounded in an idea of 
the individual defined by choice. He brought the first motion in the House of Commons for 
universal male suffrage, and defended the freedom of the press to criticise the government 
and the King from a foundation that argued that it and the liberty it defended was the 
‘birthright of a Briton’.86 Although he had popular support in London and the emerging 
United States, he was writing in a time in which the monarch played an active role in politics, 
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and he was not able to bring about a change to the Constitution’s duty basis.87 Nonetheless, 
with the members of his Bill of Rights Society, he challenged the basis of the Constitution, 
stating his loyalty was to Great Britain not the King’s person,88 rejecting the view that ‘the 
people were made entirely for the sovereign and that he had a right to dispose of their 
fortunes, lives and liberties’ at will.89 Wilke’s contemporary Thomas Paine was ultimately 
outlawed for his challenges to the duty basis of the Constitution. Openly disagreeing with 
Burke, he described the position of the individual under the Constitution as one of 
subjugation and argued for a ‘new order of thoughts’, a new understanding of the individual 
as inalienably possessing the right to choose how to live, with duties being only the 
secondary corollary of this right.90  
Against this background, consistent with Macfarlane’s subsequent analysis, at the 
beginning of the 20th Century AV Dicey claimed that English history was founded on 
‘individualism’.91 He argued that history and the influence of Bentham’s thinking, made the 
laissez faire liberty of the individual the grounding of statesmanship in the Victorian era, and 
parliament reluctant to create laws which restricted individual freedom.92 However, he also 
recognised that parliamentary sovereignty meant that the individual ultimately had to obey 
any law parliament created.93 Thus although he argued that the legal order strongly valued 
freedom, his understanding of the UK Constitution rested on an idea of the individual as 
ultimately defined by duty.  
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The Partial Erosion of the Duty Basis 
 
 In both the common law and legislation, the conception of the individual defined by 
choice has however gradually influenced ‘the relationship between the ruler and the ruled’ 
within the UK Constitution.94 The extension of the voting franchise to all non-property 
owning men and women,95 was a fundamental recognition of the capacity of free choice of all 
individuals. For Sir John Laws the judicially developed principle of the ‘presumption of 
liberty’, which entails that ‘every interference with the freedom of the individual stands in 
need of objective justification’,96 shows a commitment to the Enlightenment ideal of freedom 
of thought.97  In the case law, protection for this capacity for individual choice can be seen in 
the application of the common law ‘principle of legality’, which requires that if Parliament 
wants to infringe an important aspect of individual freedom it must do so with the clearest of 
words, or the courts will interpret ambiguous legislation in the way which maximises 
individual freedom.98 More significantly and more tentatively, in obiter comments in Jackson 
Lords Steyn and Hope discussed the possibility that a situation might arise where the 
judiciary may hold themselves not to be duty bound to enforce an Act of Parliament.99 
Building on the principle of legality’s protection for individual freedom, they considered it 
possible that the courts would not give effect to a statute which deprived individual rights of 
judicial protection and might recognise a ‘different hypothesis of constitutionalism’,100 a 
different foundation for the Constitution.  
 In the political context, some recent invocations of the Magna Carta show the 
influence of the Enlightenment conception of an individual as defined by their freedom of 
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choice. In the Magna Carta the limits on the king’s power are justified on the grounds that 
they were part of the divinely appointed dutiful monarch’s responsibilities to God.101 But 
modern reinterpretations of it within the UK and abroad view it as protecting the fundamental 
freedom of the individual.102  
 More concretely in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, where power has been 
devolved to regional legislatures,103 there is not the lack of acceptance of the Human Rights 
Act that is found in England.104 This is at least in part a consequence of the fact that the HRA 
was created at the same time as the devolved legislatures and their powers were made subject 
to it.105 The people of these parts of the UK therefore constitutionally conceptualise 
themselves, through their relationship with the state, as beings under law defined by their 
capacity for choice, not as subject-citizens constitutionally characterised as bound by a duty 
to obey all law. Through the exercise of their choice in referenda they agreed to the creation 
of the devolved assemblies, and to this basis those assemblies via the Convention rights are 
made subject. It is too early to judge whether the choice over how to be governed given in the 
Brexit referendum will similarly change how the people of England understand themselves 
and their relationship with the state. It may be that other elements of the history of the 
devolved nations and their relationship England may have a significant impact on the 
population’s understanding of the nature of the individual and their relationship with the state 
in those nations.106 The language of ‘taking back control’ used during the Brexit referendum 
campaign can be seen to appeal to individual’s desire to have greater freedom of choice over 
their own lives. However, the slogans of reasserting domestic ‘sovereignty’ can equally be 
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understood as appealing to dutiful loyalty to the UK Parliament and Queen over the law 
making bodies of the European Union. 107 
 In contrast to these movements towards recognising individuals as fundamentally 
defined by their capacity for choice, the duty-basis of the UK Constitution has characterised 
the attitude of UK governments to the Convention from the point of its creation. Government 
papers discussing its drafting evince a belief that UK law was already consistent with the 
Convention rights, and therefore individual application to a supranational court was 
unnecessary.108 However, more significantly the 1950 Attlee government refused to accept 
the ECtHR’s jurisdiction, because it ‘might be used as a weapon of political agitation in the 
cold war and . . . might subvert the respect of dependent peoples [in the colonies] for the 
established imperial authorities.’109 To allow the laws to be challenged by individuals the 
government felt would be inconstant with the UK’s sovereignty.110 The government’s 
assumption was that individuals ought to obey, not that they should be able to challenge the 
law in order to claim protection for their freedom.  
 Contemporaneous Cabinet papers indicate that the UK’s position was not mere 
political expediency. They reflect the influence of understanding individuals in the UK as 
most fundamentally having a duty to obey the law, and not as fundamentally free. According 
to Lord Jowett the Lord Chancellor, who viewed the Convention as drafted from the 
perspective of laissez faire liberty from state control,111 the Cabinet were of the view that the 
supranational enforcement of the Convention would ‘jeopardise our whole system of law, 
which we have laboriously built up over the centuries, in favour of some half-baked scheme 
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to be administered by some unknown court.’112 The Attorney-General at the time stated that 
individual petition was ‘wholly opposed to the theory of responsible Government.’113 In the 
view of the UK government the Convention’s function was to prevent the totalitarian 
takeover of a state, to protect the conception of the democratic state as the government 
understood it,114 not to maximise the freedom of individuals within democratic states.115  
 Long before the ECtHR’s use of Article 8 to directly protect the choice of an 
individual as to how to live, the civil service expressed concerns that the broad scope of its 
protection might hinder the government’s economic plans.116 Article 8 was the only right in 
the Convention which was not present in the draft of the Convention proposed by UK civil 
servants.117 On the surface this reflects the historical lack of wide protection for privacy 
within UK law. But at a deeper level, when viewed alongside the government’s concern to 
preserve sovereignty, it reflects a desire to prevent ‘external interference with the [UK’s] 
internal government’,118 symptomatic of an understanding of its citizens as fundamentally 
subjects whose primary duty was to obey the law. Although the government’s fear that an 
individual petition system would diminish the UK's state sovereignty was exaggeration,119 the 
challenge to the UK Constitution’s duty-basis from the ECtHR’s interpretation of the 
Convention as grounded in individual freedom, via the vector of the HRA, is fundamental. 
 The ECtHR recognises the Enlightenment idea of the individual as the foundation of 
the Convention rights, viewing them as attaching to a conception of a person defined by the 
capacity to freely choose how to live. That it is not the predominant conception of the 
individual underlying the UK Constitution is a consequence of the lack of any lasting 
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revolution against the state, overthrowing the established duty basis in favour of one 
grounded in the capacity of the individual for free choice. The Irish revolution and 
subsequent independence, resulted in the presence of elements of a choice conception of the 
individual within the Republic’s Constitution.120 However, it had no discernible effect on the 
foundations of the UK Constitution. This has been suggested to either reflect the perception 
of Ireland from Britain as not a full part of the United Kingdom and its departure as therefore 
of limited effect,121 or that the independence of the Republic reinforced the British identity in 
the post-WWI years rather than causing reflection upon it.122  
 It is the nature of the UK common law constitution to evolve incrementally, with its 
central principles created and developing over time.123 The duty-based foundation thus 
continues to permeate the UK Constitution and influence the understanding of rights. It is this 
that underlies the many criticisms of the HRA and suggestions for its replacement which 
emphasise its lack of mention of duties owed by individuals, and the need for their 
responsibilities as well as rights to be made clear. Both Labour and the Conservatives have 
called for the HRA’s amendment or replacement to enshrine responsibilities which give 
expression to the citizen’s duties124 alongside rights. In a Green Paper the previous Labour 
Government argued that responsibilities were ‘deeply woven into our social and moral 
fabric,’125 and felt that the HRA focused too much on individual liberty to the exclusion of 
these.126 The Conservatives have stated a desire to create a British Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities, arguing this is necessary for human rights protection to be ‘credible, just and 
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command public support’.127 To achieve this they have claimed that a new bill of rights must 
strike a more ‘appropriate balance between individual rights and responsibilities to others.’128 
More general criticism of the HRA which argues that only those who fulfil their societal 
duties should have all their rights protected, excluding prisoners and some non-UK citizens 
who are deemed to have ‘abdicated their responsibilities’,129 directly rejects a choice-basis.  
That the HRA, the Convention rights, and Article 8 particularly are controversial is a 
symptom of a deeper conflict. It is not simply a result of the government now finding their 
actions and legislation substantively reviewed by the courts.130 Rather it is a consequence of 
the underlying tension between the duty-based conception of the individual and their 
relationship to the state within the UK Constitution, under which a duty to obey Parliament 
remains sovereign, and the protection of the conception of the individual, defined by the 
capacity for choice as to how to live, that has been held to underlie the Convention rights.  
 
The Stuttering Judicial Acceptance of the Choice-basis under the HRA 
 
Although there have been many social and political changes over the centuries of the UK 
Constitution’s evolution, the conception of the individual underpinning it, as defined by the 
duties they owe, persists. The critical political and public responses to the HRA show it to be 
the predominant prism through which the relationship of the individual and the state is 
viewed in the UK. With it the ECtHR’s choice-based foundation for the Convention rights 
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conflicts. The Labour party wished with the HRA to create a culture of rights in the UK,131 
but this was not achieved simply by incorporating the Convention rights, it required a deeper 
shift in the conception of the individual upon which the UK Constitution sits. 
 The tremors of this tectonic tension between the foundation of the Convention and the 
Constitution are not confined to politicians’ criticism of human rights. It shapes the approach 
of domestic judges to the interpretation of the substantive scope and requirements of the 
Convention rights. As I described in the previous section, the judiciary as the guardians of the 
UK Constitution have over time given effect to Enlightenment ideals,132 weaving strands of 
the idea of the individual as fundamentally possessing freedom of choice into its tapestry. 
The tension between duty and choice foundation is thus not entirely new to the UK 
Constitution, a recognition of individual capacity for freedom of choice has occurred in 
several aspects of the law. However, the Convention rights incorporation is controversial 
because, instead of slow judicial erosion of the Constitution’s duty foundation through the 
Common Law’s incremental method,133 the HRA inadvertently effected a domestic 
imposition of this revolutionary conception of the individual, and enabled it to be used to 
challenge all existing law. 
 Some members of the domestic judiciary have progressively recognised and given 
effect to the choice-basis in their interpretation and application of the Convention rights. This 
development, and the resistance it encountered from judges applying a duty foundation, can 
be seen most clearly in cases concerning facts which bring moral questions close to the 
surface of the judgments. The area of law in which the difference between the duty and 
choice conceptions of the individual – and the judicial movement away from the former to 
the latter – is most apparent, is that concerning end of life decisions. However, judicial 
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recognition and adoption of the choice foundation is not universal, and its implications are 
not yet fully realised. 
 Prior to the HRA the courts were most directly confronted by the conflict between 
duty and choice conceptions in the cases of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland134 and Re A 
(Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment).135 Here the limited capacities of the 
individuals in question for choice were crucial to the judge’s finding that it was justifiable to 
bring about the end of their lives. This was a departure from the prevailing understanding of 
the principle of the sanctity of life, derived from the pre-Enlightenment religious perspective 
that an individual’s life was a gift from God, which had led to the principle being interpreted 
as imposing a duty to preserve life which took no account of individual choice, rendering 
suicide unlawful until 1961.136 Since the HRA, a line of cases concerning assisted suicide137 
has been the crucible in which the traditional UK duty conception of the individual has been 
directly challenged, and the courts have recognised with increasing openness the 
transformative effect of the choice centred conception of the individual as the basis the 
Convention rights. 
 
Some Pre-HRA Judicial Application of a Choice-basis 
 
In the Court of Appeal in Bland, Hoffmann LJ. (as he then was) explicitly engaged with the 
‘underlying moral principles’ at issue in the case.138 He felt it was necessary to do so because 
the legal and ethical issues, of whether it was right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from 
                                                 
134 [1993] AC 789 (HL). 
135 [2001] Fam 147. 
136 Suicide Act 1961, s 1; and Nicklinson, above n 9, at [90], cf [212] where Lord Sumption argued 
decriminalisation did not reflect a change in morality from duty to the maximisation of autonomy, but was done 
because it was felt that criminalising it was ‘inhuman and ineffective.’ 
137 R (Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61; Purdy, above n 8; Nicklinson, above n 9. 
138 Bland, above n 134, at 825; approved Nicklinson, above n 9, at [199] (Lord Wilson). 
Benedict Douglas 
24 
 
a person in a persistent vegetative state, could not be disentangled.139 Hoffmann LJ. 
recognised that this case involved a direct conflict between the principles of the sanctity of 
life and the autonomy of Anthony Bland.140 He however held that the sanctity of life did not 
impose a duty to keep Bland alive,141 and by considering how he would have wished to have 
been treated in his current position142 it was legitimate for the court to conclude that what ‘we 
think he would have chosen’ would be to be allowed to die.143 Although the only judge to 
reason explicitly in these fundamental terms, the ultimate decision of the House of Lords, that 
the sanctity of life did not require he be kept alive with no chance of recovery,144 is consistent 
with the deeper foundations for it that he set out.  
Re A (conjoined twins) was decided 10 days before the HRA came into force. In this 
case the court was asked to rule on whether it would be lawful to separate two conjoined 
twins. Only one twin, Jodie, could survive the operation. Mary, whose heart and brain had 
limited function, and whose lungs had none, would die as a consequence. But if they were not 
separated, both would die within months as Jodie’s heart would fail.145  
The Court of Appeal felt itself to be caught between the principle of the sanctity of 
life, which prohibited causing the death of the weaker twin, and protecting the chance of the 
only twin who could live a full life to do so. Although Ward LJ. stated that the court was one 
of law not morals, he recognised that it was confronted with ‘seemingly irreconcilable 
conflicts of moral and ethical values.’146 This appeared to be so because the Court of Appeal 
had to decide between competing conceptions of individual identity: whether to apply the 
duty-based interpretation of the sanctity of life which prohibited separation, or to maximise 
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the opportunity for life of the only child who could one day fully develop their capacity to 
exercise choice.147 
All three judges noted the importance of the principle of the sanctity of life within the 
law, explicitly acknowledging its roots within the Common Law in the Judaeo-Christian 
religious duty to preserve live.148 Each judge used different reasoning to conclude that, in 
spite of this, it would be lawful to separate the twins.149 However, they all ultimately adopted 
approaches consistent with the application of a choice-based conception of the individual.  
Each judge in turn argued that separation of the twins was justified in order to allow the 
only twin who could to live a life exercising freedom of choice to live to do so. Ward LJ., 
although noting that each twin had an equal right to life, held that:  
Mary is ‘designated for death’ because her capacity to live her life is fatally 
compromised. The prospect of a full life for Jodie is counterbalanced by an acceleration 
of certain death for Mary. That balance is heavily in Jodie's favour. . . . [I]t is, in my 
judgment, impossible not to put in the scales of each child the manner in which they are 
individually able to exercise their right to life.150 
Brooke LJ., saw the case as requiring a choice between an argument that Mary’s life 
must not be unnaturally shortened by separation, and the argument that ‘it would be immoral 
not to assist Jodie if there is a good prospect that she might live a happy and fulfilled life if 
this operation is performed.’151 Influenced by the latter approach he interpreted the sanctity of 
life as protecting ‘the integrity of the human body’, and stated that the separation would give 
both twins their bodily integrity.152 Looking to the coming into force of the HRA in a few 
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days’ time, he presciently concluded that this was an outcome which Article 8’s protection for 
autonomy supported.153 
Walker LJ. also decided the case by reinterpreting the right to life to reflect the 
moral importance of the capacity to exercise choice. He held that  
[e]ach twin's right to life includes the right to physical integrity, that is the right 
to a whole body over which the individual will, on reaching an age of 
understanding, have autonomy and the right to self-determination.154  
He stated that  
[e]very human being's right to life carries with it, as an intrinsic part of it, rights 
of bodily integrity and autonomy—the right to have one's own body whole and 
intact and (on reaching an age of understanding) to take decisions about one's 
own body.155  
With this almost explicit application of a choice conception of individual identity, he held that 
the operation was in the best interests of both twins as it would ‘give Jodie a reasonably good 
prospect of a long and reasonably normal life’, and give Mary ‘even in death, bodily integrity 
as a human being.’156 
Thus although in their judgments they rejected the idea of evaluating the value of life 
of the two twins,157 their decisions to nonetheless support the separation were, at a 
fundamental level, motivated by the weight they attributed to their relative ability to live a 
life characterised by choice. This case thus demonstrates how duty and choice conceptions of 
the individual as the basis for substantive rights conflicted under the Common Law as well as 
the Convention rights. But more importantly, it shows the UK courts recognising and 
interpretively using a choice-basis to interpret the law and human rights. 
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Dialogue with the ECtHR 
 
In the three key cases in which the courts have ruled on the legality of the provision of 
assistance to a terminally ill person to end their life, this conflict between the duty-based and 
the choice-based conceptions of the individual has been the underlying tension, and has led to 
different interpretations of the Convention rights. The progression of the judgments of our 
highest court shows a growing acceptance and application of a choice-based foundation for 
the Convention rights, through dialogue with the ECtHR and its interpretation of the basis of 
the Convention. 
In the 2001 case of R (Pretty) v DPP 158 the House of Lords rejected the claim that 
Article 8 encompassed a right to be assisted to commit suicide. This conclusion was the 
consequence of the application of a duty-based interpretative approach. The Lords rejected 
Diane Pretty’s argument that the Article 2 right to life protected her right to choose when to 
die as well as her right to live. They did so on the basis that it protected the ‘sanctity of 
human life’,159 requiring its preservation from harm.160 The Lords explicitly recognised that 
this conflicted with the view that the ‘autonomy of individuals is predominant’161 in questions 
of rights, but held that consent could not override the protection of life in Article 2 and the 
legislative prohibition on assisted suicide.162 This view of the basis of Article 2, influenced 
the majority of the Lords’ interpretation of Article 8 as also not being engaged by the facts. 
Although the Lords that recognised that Article 8 protected individual autonomous choice as 
to how to live,163 they held that this did not extend to choosing how to die,164 Lord Bingham 
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stating that to do so would undermine what it was supposed to protect.165 Lord Hope came 
closest to recognising that Article 8’s particular protection of individual choice engaged the 
right; considering that ‘private life is engaged even where . . . she seeks to choose death 
rather than life’, though he held its wording could not recognise a right to be assisted to 
commit suicide.166 
That the House of Lords was wrong – in failing to recognise and apply the basis of the 
Convention rights in the protection of the individual’s capacity for choice – was made clear 
when Diane Pretty went to Strasbourg. The ECtHR agreed that the wording of Article 2 did 
not permit it to be interpreted as protecting a right to die.167 However, beginning by clearly 
stating the choice-basis for the Convention,168 the ECtHR relied upon it to find that Article 8 
was engaged as it protected ‘individual autonomy’,169 which it interpreted as encompassing 
the freedom ‘to conduct one's life in a manner of one's own choosing’.170 The ECtHR thus 
explicitly rejected the duty-based reasoning influential on the House of Lords, that to 
recognise the Convention as protecting a right to choose to die would go against the very 
purpose of the Convention rights.171 The Strasbourg court did not see this conclusion as 
contrary to the sanctity of life or Article 2, because the Convention’s basis in the capacity for 
choice entailed that the value of continuing to live was determined by the choice of an 
individual themselves.172  
The ECtHR’s intervention led the House of Lords in R (Purdy) v DPP to accept that 
Article 8 was engaged and violated by a failure of the DPP to give clear guidance on when 
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someone would be prosecuted for assisting suicide.173 The Lady and Lords accepted the 
ECtHR’s decision in Pretty that protection for individual choice as to how to live their life 
underlies Article 8174 and the Convention generally.175  
The gathering momentum of the domestic judicial recognition of the choice-basis of 
the Convention, can be seen in the most recent major case concerning the end of life. In R 
(Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice176 the parties challenged the laws prohibition on assisted 
suicide under Article 8. Lord Neuberger recognised and engaged directly with an underlying 
choice-basis, holding ‘that the answer, both in law and in morality, can best be found by 
reference to personal autonomy.’177  Lord Sumpton recognised both autonomy and the 
sanctity of life were moral principles which the law protects.178 But consistent with seeing 
autonomy as underpinned by the fundamental capacity for choice he stated that: ‘with no 
rational or utilitarian justification, [autonomy is] fundamental to our humanity’ and was 
encapsulated within the principle ‘that individuals are entitled to be the masters of their own 
fate.’179 Lord Hughes took a very wide interpretation of Article 8, implying private life could 
encompass anything a person chose to do, with whether there was an enforceable right to do 
it depending on whether there were any competing Article 8(2) considerations which 
mitigated against it.180 Lord Mance similarly recognised that whether there was a violation of 
Article 8 depended on the balance between autonomy and competing factors,181 which are 
united in protecting the free choice of people as to whether to die.182 Some of the Justices 
recognised that the principle of sanctity of life had a long history within the common law and 
international human rights law, however they held that autonomy conflicted with and 
                                                 
173 Purdy, above n 8, at [53-54] & [56]. 
174 Ibid, at [32], [38], [60], [61], [71] & [82]. 
175 Ibid, at [38], citing Pretty, above n 3, [65]. 
176 Nicklinson, above n 9. 
177 Ibid, at [95], see also [96]-[98]. 
178 Ibid, at [208]. 
179 Ibid, at [208]. 
180 Ibid, at [263]; cf Countryside Alliance, above n 60, at [10]-[15] & [138]-[139]. 
181 Nicklinson, above n 9, at [160]. 
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Benedict Douglas 
30 
 
overrode the law’s previous understanding of it, as it had been held to do by the ECtHR in 
Pretty.183 Thus the choice conception of the individual was the foundational interpretive 
principle in this case, though ultimately the majority held that it was constitutionally 
inappropriate for the Court to rule on whether Article 8 had been violated until after 
Parliament had taken the opportunity to reconsider the law.184 
 
Unresolved Underlying Tension  
 
However, even in the context of Article 8, there is not yet universal acceptance within the 
judiciary of the choice-based understanding of the individual and recognition of its 
implications for the interpretation of rights. The consequences of this can be seen in the 
conflicting reasoning of the Supreme Court judgments in Re JR38,185 and in the difference in 
approach between the High Court and the Court of Appeal in R (Burke) v GMC.186 
The Northern Irish case of Re JR38 raised the question of whether the police’s 
publication of photographs of a 14-year-old participating in a riot engaged his Article 8 
rights. In the Supreme Court, Lords Toulson and Clarke, with both of whom Lord Hodge 
agreed without giving a separate judgment, held that the right was not engaged.  Lord 
Toulson began by asking whether the claimant had a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in 
relation to the activity in which he was engaged.187 He naturally concluded that rioting ‘is not 
the kind of activity which Article 8 exists to protect.’188 He acknowledged that the underlying 
value protected by Article 8 was individual autonomy.189 But by applying the ‘reasonable 
                                                 
183 Ibid, at [199] (Lord Wilson) & [209] (Lord Mance). 
184 Ibid, at [113] (Lord Neuberger), [188] (Lord Mance) , [201] (Lord Wilson), [234] (Lord Sumption), [267] 
(Lord Hughes), [290] (Lord Clarke) & [297]-[298] (Lord Reed). 
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expectation’ test of privacy in a way which focused in a narrow manner on the nature of the 
applicant’s actions,190 he did not have regard to the wider impact of the police’s actions on 
the applicant’s capacity to choose how to live.  
In contrast Lord Kerr, with whom Lord Wilson agreed, argued that Article 8 was 
engaged. He rejected the narrow focus of Lord Toulson and instead looked to the 
fundamental basis of the right, in the protection of an individual’s autonomy and construction 
of their ‘identity and personal development’,191 to determine when a person could reasonably 
expect privacy.192 Lord Kerr explicitly recognised this made Article 8 the Convention right 
with the ‘broadest potential scope of application.’193 Applying this basis to determine whether 
Article 8 was engaged he asked: what was the impact of the publication of the photographs 
on a 14 year old child’s life, the development of his personality and future life choices? He 
held that it would impact these by its potential to stigmatise the child as a criminal,194 and 
thus there was a reasonable expectation of privacy engaging his Article 8 right, though the 
impingement upon it was justified under Article 8(2).195  
In his deciding judgment on the question of whether Article 8 was engaged, Lord 
Clarke like Lord Kerr considered the implication of the publication on the child’s identity 
more generally,196 but unlike him felt the impact was of insufficient gravity to engage his 
Article 8 rights. He did not accept Lord Toulson’s argument that without a reasonable 
expectation of privacy ‘there is no relevant interference with personal autonomy so as to 
engage article 8.’197 He considered, like Lord Kerr,  whether the state’s actions interfered 
with the child’s autonomous development of their personality to decide whether Article 8 was 
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191 Ibid, at [37], quoting PG v UK (2001) 46 EHRR 1272 at [56]. 
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engaged; however he reached the conclusion that they did not and thus held Article 8 did not 
prohibit the publication.198 Lord Clarke’s analytical approach and acknowledgement of the 
broad scope of Article 8 is thus in agreement with Lord Kerr’s, though he reached a different 
conclusion on applying it to the facts. 
Lord Toulson’s narrow approach failed to adequately recognise or engage with the 
deeper basis of the Convention rights, of which Article 8 is the raw manifestation, in 
protecting individuals’ capacity for choice as to how to live though which they define 
themselves. His approach is therefore inconsistent with the fundamental basis of Article 8 
recognised by the ECtHR in Pretty v UK and the domestic decisions in Purdy and Nicklinson. 
Lord Kerr and Lord Clarke’s approach applies and is consistent with the basis of Article 8 
and the Convention rights more generally. Lord Hodge, in claiming to fully agree with both 
Lord Toulson and Clarke, did not engage with the fundamental issue distinguishing the two 
judgments. More widely, this case shows the application of the choice basis outside of cases 
concerning end of life decisions, but also that there is not universal recognition and 
agreement within the Supreme Court as to the nature of the fundamental basis of the 
Convention rights and its role in determining the scope of the rights. 
The tension between a choice and duty basis for rights has been recognised by Shaun 
Pattinson199 as the key distinction between the High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in 
Burke. Oliver Burke, who suffered from a degenerative brain condition, challenged the 
Convention compatibility of GMC guidelines, which would allow artificial nutrition and 
hydration to be withdrawn from him in the event his illness reduced him to a conscious but 
‘locked in’ mental state, where he could not communicate his treatment wishes.  
In the High Court, Munby J interpreted Articles 2, 3 and 8 in a manner which gave 
effect to a choice-basis for the Convention. He used both the Common Law, relying in 
                                                 
198 Ibid, at [113]-[115]. 
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particular on Hoffmann LJ’s decision in Bland,200 and the Convention, as interpreted using 
the choice-based approach taken in Pretty v UK, to derive a set of principles to guide his 
judgment on when a patient has a right to life-prolonging treatment.201 Whilst these included 
sanctity of life and dignity, he ultimately applies a choice-basis to interpret the Convention 
rights.202 ‘Important as the sanctity of life is, it has to take second place to personal 
autonomy…’.203 Although he treated autonomy and dignity as distinct in also saying that 
‘[sanctity of life] may have to take second place to human dignity’, his conceptualisation of 
dignity presupposes a choice-basis for it, as he describes dignity as requiring medical 
treatment to safeguard ‘mental stability’ and to protecting the patient from dying in a manner 
that the patient finds excessively distressing.204  
The Court of Appeal, in contrast with the High Court, but in line with the UK’s 
historically prevailing duty conception of the individual, relied only on common law 
authorities to support a judgement setting out the law in terms of the duties it imposes on the 
medical profession to provide ANH.205 Whereas Munby J concluded that Burke ‘had the right 
to insist on receiving life-prolonging ANH, the Court of Appeal concluded that Burke would 
merely be the beneficiary of a duty to provide such treatment’: he had a right to refuse it, but 
not to choose it.206   
The influence of the ECtHR statement of the choice-based foundation in Pretty forced 
the Supreme Court in Purdy and Nicklinson to apply an understanding of the individual 
defined by the capacity to choose how to live to interpret the Convention. The application of 
this basis can also be seen in the judgments of  some members of the judiciary in non-end of 
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life cases.207 However, Burke and JR38 show the continuing existence and interpretive 
consequences of the fundamental disagreement underlying the domestic courts’ 
interpretations of the Convention rights. Thus far only some members of the judiciary have 
recognised and given effect to the acceleration in the movement from a duty to a choice 
conception of the individual, which began with the Enlightenment and whose recognition is 
now mandated by the ECtHR’s interpretation of the Convention. Through their development 
of the Common Law and the modifications they have made and threatened to the core 
constitutional principles of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, through the 
presumption of liberty and in cases such as Jackson, the courts as guardians of the UK 
Constitution have given some effect to the Enlightenment ideals, steering the Constitution’s 
gradual evolution from its historical duty-basis. The HRA, through the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of the Convention rights, presents a challenge to the remaining influence of the 
duty conception of the individual within the UK Constitution and judicial reasoning. The 
courts have responded to this but the new conception of the individual, the true 
Enlightenment culture of rights, has not yet been fully accepted by the judiciary. 
  
Conclusion 
 
The stated intention behind the creation of the HRA was to give domestic judicial protection 
to the Convention rights and to create a culture of rights within the UK.208 The controversy 
and dissatisfaction the Act has generated, the calls for its repeal, amendment or replacement, 
indicate that the original goals have not been securely achieved. The fundamental reason for 
                                                 
207 For example: Re G (Children) [2012] EWCA Civ 1233 at [60], [80] & [82] (Munby LJ giving judgment for 
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the Act’s precarious position is that it has become a lightning rod for a conflict between two 
fundamentally distinct conceptions of the individual.  
The ECtHR has held that the Convention, in line with human rights norms declared 
since the Enlightenment, is inalienably grounded in and protects a conception of the 
individual as possessing the capacity to choose how to live and through choosing to shape 
their identity. In contrast, as a result of the continuity of the UK Constitution over the last 
thousand years, there has never been a clear moment in which this conception of the 
individual has been recognised across the UK as the foundation of our society and our law. 
There has only been a gradual but incomplete erosion of the historic conception of the 
individual as defined by the duties they owe, which formed the justifying foundation of the 
divine right of kings, and the basis from which parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law 
evolved. Although legislation and judicial decisions have given increasing recognition to the 
idea that the individual is defined by their capacity for choice, the HRA combined with the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence present a revolutionary challenge to the continuing influence of the 
duty-based conception of the individual which has long formed the foundation of the UK 
Constitution. 
The UK judiciary are beginning to acknowledge and give effect to the distinct basis of 
the Convention rights. The end of life cases show a recognition of the capacity for choice as 
the nature of the individual which the Convention rights protect. However, Re JR38 and 
Burke demonstrate that recognition of the distinct fundamental basis of the Convention rights 
is not yet universal amongst the judiciary. 
If the Convention rights are to be accepted and applied in the UK, in a way consistent 
with their fundamental nature as recognised by the ECtHR and within other human rights 
documents, there must be more than their legislative incorporation or amendment. It must be 
recognised that they bring with them a fundamental assumption about the nature of the 
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individual, from which they derive and which they protect. Until this basis for rights and the 
challenge it brings to the historical fundamental foundation of the UK Constitution is more 
widely accepted, rights protection and particularly Article 8 will face hostility. Any new bill 
of rights which emphasises responsibilities and duties will not represent the fuller acceptance 
of the Convention into the UK, it will rather enshrine the rejection of the fundamental basis 
of human rights. 
